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Hellerstein: Criminal Procedure Decisions

THE LINE HOLDS, BUT DEATH MAY MATTER:
THE SUPREME COURT'S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE DECISIONS OF THE 2001 TERM
William Hellerstein'
As I have said now for fourteen years, it is always a
pleasure to come to Touro Law School to talk about the work of
the Supreme Court in the criminal procedure field. This was a
significant year in general and a highly successful year for law
enforcement. With the exception of the capital punishment cases,
it was almost a clean sweep for law enforcement, and that may tell
you something about the drift of the country and the Court.
Accordingly, in a number of search and seizure cases, the Court
mentioned terrorism, even though there was no element of
terrorism in the particular case. The subject also comes up in oral
argument and it is clearly something that the Court is concerned
with.2 I believe that the Fourth Amendment cases reflect that
concern and I will begin with them.
Search and Seizure Decisions
The first case is United States v. Drayton.3 This was a six
to three decision with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority. It
concerned what I call the "working the buses" practice that federal
and state officials use in Florida on major drug routes. Essentially,
"working the buses" involves law enforcement's well-founded
belief that a large amount of drug traffic passes through the
Greyhound Bus Line's system of transportation, and similar bus
lines.4 In this particular instance, passengers on a Greyhound Bus
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Brooklyn College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. Professor Hellerstein teaches Constitutional Law, Civil
Rights Law, and Criminal Procedure. He is an expert in criminal law and
constitutional litigation; and he has argued numerous appeals before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the New York Court of Appeals.
2See, e.g., Charles Lane, High Court to Hear Case on Public Searches;
Ruling
Could Affect Domestic War on Terrorism, Bush Administration Says, WASH.
POST, Jan. 5, 2002, at A 10.
3536 U.S. 194 (2002).
4 See generally John R. Nussbaumer, Working the Buses: Close Encounters of
the Third Kind?, 7 PREVIEW 224 (March 19, 1991).
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were traveling from Fort Lauderdale to Detroit. 5 At one point
during the trip, the bus driver made a scheduled stop at a rest area
where passengers had to get off while the bus was being cleaned
and refueled.
While the bus driver left the bus to complete
paperwork, three Drug Enforcement Agency agents boarded the
bus.7 One agent knelt on the driver's seat and faced the rear of the
bus; one agent went to the rear of the bus and the other agent
walked up the aisle asking passengers about their travel plans, and
if they would mind if their luggage was searched.8
The two unfortunate defendants in this case consented to
the search of their luggage, which turned up no evidence or
contraband. 9 However, the agents' suspicions were aroused and
the agent working the aisle asked the defendants if they would
mind being patted down, and they consented." ° It was warm and
the defendants were wearing baggy, warm clothes, although they
were going to Detroit." Of course, the searches of both men
uncovered narcotics.12 The issue was whether this procedure
constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.' 3 If it
did, it would mean there had to be reasonable suspicion in order
for the seizure to be constitutional.14
The Court held that the actions of the agents did not give
rise to a seizure, and therefore, the agents were under no obligation
to advise the passengers that they had a right to refuse the search. 15
The Eleventh Circuit upheld suppression of the evidence found on
the defendants based upon the fact that certain of its prior decisions
had held that passengers did not feel free to leave in these

5Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197.

6Id.
7

1d.

8id.
9

Id.

1o

Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199.

I1Id.

12 id.

"3Id. at 197.
14

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a police officer does not need

probable cause to stop and frisk, he only needs reasonable suspicion based upon
the circumstances).
15 Drayton, 536

U.S. at 203, 206.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss1/3

2

Hellerstein: Criminal Procedure Decisions

2002

CRIMINAL PROCEDUREDECISIONS

situations. 16 However, a majority of the Supreme Court disagreed.17
The Court said that the proper inquiry, after Florida v. Bostick,
decided several years ago, is whether a reasonable person would
18
feel free to decline an officer's request to conduct a search.
Justice Kennedy stated that a reasonable person would feel free to
decline giving an officer permission to conduct the search. 19 He
reasoned that the passengers on the bus would have felt free to
decline the agent's request to search because the agents gave the
passengers no reason to believe that they were required to
comply. 20 In addition, Kennedy pointed out, the agents did not
brandish their weapons, the aisle was free so people could exit, the
passengers. were spoken to in a quiet, polite voice, and the officer
21
in the front seat did nothing to intimidate the passengers.
Furthermore, of considerable importance to Justice Kennedy was
the fact that the passengers answered the officer's questions and
otherwise cooperated because the passengers knew that their
participation enhanced their own safety and the safety of those
around them. 22 Moreover, he asserted, a search in a society based
on law, the concepts of agreement and consent should be given a
weight and dignity of their own.2 3
Let me ask, if you were on a bus and in this situation,
would your reaction be to state to the agent, "it is my pleasure to
cooperate with your hunt for whatever you are looking for"?
Would you be thinking, "sure you can search my bags, pat me
16 United

States v. Drayton, 213 F.3d 787, 790 (l1th Cir. 2000). See United

States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1355-57 (11th Cir. 1998). In Washington,
federal agents searched passengers on a bus after it made a scheduled stop. Id.
at 1355. The search revealed cocaine concealed in the pants of one of the
passengers. Id. at 1356. The court stated that the facts and circumstances
surrounding the search indicated that "a reasonable person in the defendant's
position would not have felt free to disregard [the agent's] request without some
positive indication that consent could have been refused." Id. at 1357. The
court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.
'7501 U.S. 429 (1991).
ISDrayton, 536 U.S. at 201.
19Id. at

204.

20 Id.
21 id.
22 Id.
23 Drayton, 536

U.S. at 207.
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down, whatever you like, because I live in a society where dignity
goes with consent"?
That is essentially the sociological
assumption of the case, expounded by Justice Kennedy for the
majority. However, that is not quite the response that my criminal
procedure students have given me. I asked them to raise their
hands if they would feel free to say to an officer, particularly in the
confines of a bus, "I would like to terminate my encounter." Most
of my students replied that they would not even say so to an officer
on the open street. Perhaps more may do so now since they know
their rights, but I doubt it.
Justice Souter in dissent said essentially: "come on, wait a
minute. This is not the airport; this is not even the street., 24 There
is an air of unreality about the majority's social psychology.25 He
suggested that if an individual is in an alley and three officers
come his or her way, would he or she feel free to terminate the
encounter and say, "I will see you later"? 26 Souter did not think so
and he argued that no reasonable passenger could have believed
that he stood nothing to lose if he refused to cooperate with the
police. 27 However, that is not what the majority believed.
What is the significance of this opinion? The significance
is essentially that the Court has made a value judgment in the war
on drugs and weapons in that Fourth Amendment protections
should take a backseat. You can resolve for yourself whether
Justice Kennedy's psychological assumptions are an accurate
portrayal of how any of us feel with respect to police behavior in
this context. My own view is that Justice Kennedy's opinion is
either naYve about our normal proclivities and our own
psychological state or, if not, it is disingenuous because he knows
it is not the way we really are.
This case reminds me of those old movies from the 1940's
and 1950's starring actors like Frederic March and Jimmy Stewart
where the Gestapo stop people on the trains and buses and ask for
their papers. I raise the question whether the war on drugs is worth
the civil liberties tradeoff as we consistently go in this direction. I

Id. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting the majority opinion).
26
Id. at 210.
24
25

27 Id.
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think the Court has made the commitment in that direction and I
think it unfortunate.
Second in importance to Drayton is Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 v. Earls.28 This was a five to
four decision written by Justice Thomas.2 9 It extended the right of
school officials to conduct random urine testing of all students who
choose to participate in any extracurricular activities. The Court
first gave a green light to school officials in Vernonia School
District47J v. Acton.3 Vernonia involved the random drug testing
of high school athletes, who were tested because they were
considered role models for other students. 3 1 Using Vernonia's
balancing test, Justice Thomas concluded that the school's policy
is reasonable in light of the limited privacy expectation of students,
the non-intrusive nature of32the urine test, and the school's need to
prevent and deter drug use.
33
Justice O'Connor wrote a scathing dissent in Vernonia,
and in this case she dissented as well.34 But the controlling vote
rested upon Justice Breyer's concurring opinion. I will talk about
that in a moment. Justice Thomas upheld the urine testing
procedure in this case even though the record did not indicate
extensive drug use by students who were engaged in
extracurricular activities at the school. That there was some, plus
the fact that there is a nationwide problem with drug usage by
teenagers, was deemed reason enough.35 In addition, Thomas
opined that it is too much to ask courts to articulate a threshold
level of drug use that would suffice to justify a drug-testing
program for school children. 36 Thus, he refused to fashion what

28 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
29

Id. at 824.

30 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
31 Id. at 663 (stating "It seems to us self-evident that a drug problem largely
fueled by the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use and of particular danger to
athletes is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs.").

32 Earls, 536 U.S. at 831-35.
33 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 666 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34 Earls, 536 U.S. at 842 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"
36 Id. at

834-35.

Id. at 836.
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would in effect be a constitutional37 quantum of drug use necessary
to demonstrate a "drug problem."
Several years ago, when the U.S. Customs employees38 and
the railroad accident cases39 were before the Court, the Court could
have accepted the government's argument that urine testing is not a
search and urine testing by government officials would have been
outside the Fourth Amendment; however, the Court said urine
testing is a search.4 0 Nonetheless, the Court has extended the
government's right to conduct random urine testing, with but one
exception, and that was Chandler v. Miller,4' decided two terms
ago. Chandler involved urine testing of candidates for political
office in Georgia.42 The Court concluded that the connection
between drug use and candidacy for office was too distended.43
The significance of Earls is that it extends the Vernonia
Justice
ruling to all intramural extracurricular activities.4 4
Ginsburg's dissent points out that the Tecumseh urine-testing
program is perverse and capricious.45 She noted that the program
targets a student population that is least likely to be at risk for
46
illicit drugs and the damaging effects that drugs cause.
Accordingly, she wrote, "[n]otwithstanding nightmarish images of
out-of-control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding tubas
disturbing the peace and quiet of Tecumseh, the great majority of
students the School District seeks to test in truth are engaged 4in7
activities that are not safety sensitive to an unusual degree.
Some kids who are going to be tested, she noted, participate in the
choir and the band.
Of course, the price one pays' for not submitting to the
testing program is not being permitted to participate in
37

id.

38 Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
39 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
40

Id. at 607, 607 n. 1.
(1997).

41 520 U.S. 305
4 2Id. at 309.
43
44

41

Id. at 323.

Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38.
Id. at 843.

46 Id.

47

48

Id. at 852.
id.
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extracurricular activities. Which is to say, "well, if you believe in
the Fourth Amendment, stand tall and hold on." Of course, when a
student applies for admission to college and he or she is asked,
"How come you didn't participate in any extracurricular activities
in high school," a principled Fourth Amendment stand may prove
very costly.
A key concern is Justice Breyer's concurrence. I do not
know what he was thinking when he stated, "I believe it is
important that the school board provided an opportunity for the
airing of these differences at public meetings, designed to give the
entire community the opportunity to be able to participate in
developing the drug policy. ' 49 Justice Breyer was referring to a
Tecumseh town meeting where the majority of parents raised their
hands in support of urine testing. Well, do you submit the
Constitution and the meaning of the Constitution to the "hands
have it?" Justice Breyer seems to think that is a very important
factor and it controls his vote. 50 He does admit that it is a high
price to pay not to participate in extracurricular activities, but the
fact that the Tecumseh folks wanted drug testing seems to him to
make it all right.5 '
You may recall reading on the front page of Sunday's New
York Times last week that because of this case, school districts
around the country are now considering whether they can test the
entire student population. 52 I do not believe that this case holds
that a school district can test an entire school's population.
However, I believe that the broad language of Justice Thomas'
opinion, especially his allusion to the national teenage drug
problem, as distinguished from the immediate problem in the
Tecumseh School District, may yet carry the majority of the Court
when it is presented with an overall school-testing program. I do
not necessarily believe that Justice Breyer's vote will be confined
to the testing of students who participate in extracurricular
activities. I suppose that if everybody has a town meeting, all that

49 Earls, 536 U.S.
50 Id.
51

at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Id.

52See Tamar Lewin, With Court Nod, ParentsDebate School Drug Tests, N.Y.
TIMES,

Sep. 29, 2002, at Al.
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is necessary to obtain Justice Breyer's vote would be a raise of
hands, with the majority prevailing.
The merits of such a broad-based urine-testing program, as
a matter of policy are yours to determine. I can only think of
Justice O'Connor's dissent in the Vernonia case when she quoted
from the testimony of the father of the child who did not want to
submit to drug testing and who subsequently challenged the
practice. 53 In the district court, he asked whether a urine testing
program that is founded on a suspicion that children are law
violators is the kind of citizenship message that we want to give to
our students. 54 That is a policy question, but it also implicates our
constitutional judgment.
There are two other Fourth Amendment cases decided in
the government's favor that merit discussion. The first is United
States v. Arvizu. 55 On the border of Arizona in the southeastern
part of the state, a border patrol agent seized a vehicle that had
triggered a sensor on the highway.5 6 There was concern about
illegal immigrants and drug smugglers using these particular
roads. 7 Once the sensor was triggered, the officer responded to
investigate. The officer saw a minivan, (not a four-wheel drive
vehicle), with the father driving, the mother in the passenger seat,
and three children in the back with their feet propped up on what
looked like some kind of cargo. 59 As he observed them, the father
tried to ignore the officer, and the children were waving in an
abnormal pattern as if they were being instructed to wave.60 The
combination of these factors and the officer's experience triggered
something in his mind: the family was on a road that was close to
the border, the road was known for smuggling activity, and it did
not seem that they were coming from, or going to, a picnic. The

53 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 682 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54 id.

"
56 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
Id. at 269.
17

Id. at 268-69

58 Id. at 269-70.
'9

Id. at 270.

60Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 271.
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there had to be drugs and, of course, the officer
officer assumed
61
was correct.

The Ninth Circuit, which has one of the worst track records
in the Supreme Court of any circuit, decided in this case that
everything the officer saw was innocent conduct: family driving,
children waving, and legitimate use of the road.62 The court
actually considered eight to ten factors and determined them all to
be innocent. 63 The Supreme Court reversed and held that this
method of analysis was unacceptable: one plus one in fact can
equal three, or five plus five can equal eleven. 64 Why? Because
accepting the Ninth Circuit's analysis does an injustice to the way
stop and frisk seizures should be assessed. Even though each fact
observed may be innocent in itself, inferences that create
can properly be drawn, and that is all the
reasonable suspicion
66
here.
did
officer
What is most important about this case is that in addition to
the rejection of the Ninth Circuit's "innocent conduct divide and
conquer" approach, as the Supreme Court called it, is that the
Court puts a substantially favorable thumb on the surveilling police
officer's experience. 67 Therefore, a combination of the officer's
experience plus the totality of circumstances is the way that the
existence of reasonable suspicion should be determined.68
However, there is nothing terribly new here, and anyone who is
involved with these types of cases knows they are very fact
specific. However, I think what it does provide is further incentive
to trial judges to afford a greater amount of leeway to a police
officer's expertise.
I have always felt that reasonable suspicion or even
probable cause determinations are very subjective. If you put ten
61 Id. at 272 (discovering approximately 129 pounds of marijuana in the
defendant's vehicle).
62 id.
63 Id. at 272-73 (citing the decision below).
64 Id. at 273, 274-75; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989)

("Factors which by themselves were 'quite consistent with innocent travel'

collectively amounted to reasonable suspicion.").
65

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.

66 Id. at 273, 277.
67
68

Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 277.
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judges in a room, five will say no probable cause and five will say
there was probable cause. In Arvizu, the Supreme Court has
emphasized the importance of getting rid of the Ninth Circuit's
factors and
procedure of simply adding up innocent conduct
69
suspicion.
reasonable
than
less
coming up with
The last Fourth Amendment case, United States v.
Knights, 70 was a unanimous decision that held constitutional a
search of a probationer's home based only on reasonable suspicion
rather than on probable cause. 7 1 In this case, the defendant
committed a drug offense and received probation. 72 He signed a
document that said essentially, "you may search my home at any
time without any cause. 7 3 Therefore, as a condition of probation,
ostensibly he could be held to the agreement. The question
presented was whether the Fourth Amendment would permit this
agreement to be enforced.74
However, the Court did not reach that question. The Court
simply held that as regards a probationer, reasonable suspicion is
enough to search his home; it is not necessary that there be
probable cause. 75 The argument made by the probationer in the
lower court was that the probation officer was not performing 76a
task related to a probation problem, but to a police investigation.
The Supreme Court said it had never drawn a distinction between
investigatory and probationary 77enforcement searches, and that it
Therefore, from the probation
was not going to do so here.
defendant's universe, the good news is that there is a reasonable
69
70

Id. at 274.
534 U.S. 112 (2001).

"'
72 Id. at 121.
Id. at 114.
73 Id.

74 Id.
71 Knights,

534 U.S. at 121 ("Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily
requires the degree of probability embodied in the term 'probable cause,' a
lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and
private interests makes such a standard reasonable.").
76 United States v. Knights, 219 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000).
77 Knights, 534 U.S. at 116 ("Certainly nothing in the condition of probation
suggests that it was confined to searches bearing upon probationary status and
nothing more. The search condition provides that Knights will submit to a
search "by any probation officer or law enforcement officer" and does not
mention anything about purpose.").
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suspicion requirement, so that even the signing of a total consent
78
document does not necessarily allow the search of one's home.
The bad news is that a probationer's home can be intruded upon
with less than probable cause, 79 a largely debatable proposition, for
the Court has always placed the home at the top of the scale of
Fourth Amendment protections.80
Although the government prevailed in the cases described
above, it did lose one case, Kirk v. Louisiana.81 This case, decided
per curiam, was a reaffirmation and reminder that the Supreme
Court's decision in Payton v. New York82 is still good law.83 In
Payton, the Court held that law enforcement officers must obtain
an arrestee's home in the absence
an arrest warrant before entering
84
circumstances.
exigent
of
Fifth Amendment - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
One decision I find quite troubling is McKune v. Lile, 5 a
privilege against self-incrimination case in which the Court applied
a questionable due process analysis in order to avoid selfincrimination precedents that favored the prisoner. It was a five to
four decision with a plurality opinion written by Justice Kennedy
and a concurrence by Justice O'Connor. In McKune, the Court
7

ld. at 121.

79 id.

80 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (stating "with few

exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable
and hence constitutional must be answered no."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980) (stating "in terms that apply equally to seizures of property and
to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firn line at the
entrance to the house.").
s 536 U.S. 635 (2002).
2 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
83Kirk, 536 U.S. at 638 ("As Payton makes plain police officers need either a
warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful
entry into a home. The Court of Appeal's ruling to the contrary, and consequent
failure to assess whether exigent circumstances were present in this case,
violated Payton.").
84 Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 ("In terms that apply equally to seizures of property
and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant.").
8' 536 U.S. 24 (2002).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [2002], Art. 3

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 19

upheld a Kansas law that required a prisoner to admit
responsibility for all sex offenses, even those that have not yet
been prosecuted, 86as a condition for the enjoyment of numerous
prison privileges.
Suppose an attorney represents someone who insists that he
is innocent. However, the client has been convicted of a crime and
the attorney is currently working on the client's case. Then
suppose that the attorney receives a letter from the defendant
stating, "I can get an early parole if I comply with the prison and
enter a sex offender treatment program. However, if I enter this
program, I will have to accept responsibility for a sex crime of
which I am innocent." In a situation such as this, what should the
attorney advise the defendant to tell the parole board? What does
he tell the institution that says if you go to the sex offender
program you get out early, but going to the sex offender program
means you have to admit to all of your offenses?
In this particular case, under Kansas law, it is mandatory
for a defendant to accept responsibility and disclose all of his sex
offenses, even those that have not yet been prosecuted.87
86 Id. at

35. The Court held:
The [Kansas Sex Abuse Treatment Program] does not compel
prisoners to incriminate themselves in violation of the
Constitution . . .. The consequences in question here -- a
transfer to another prison where television sets are not placed
in each inmate's cell, where exercise facilities are not readily

available, and where work and wage opportunities are more
limited -- are not ones that compel a prisoner to speak about
his past crimes despite a desire to remain silent.
I1.
87

Id. at 30. The Court stated:
In 1994, a few years before respondent was scheduled to be
released, prison officials ordered him to participate in a Sexual
Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program,
participating inmates are required to complete and sign an
"Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they discuss
and accept responsibility for the crime for which they have
been sentenced. Participating inmates also are required to
complete a sexual history form, which details all prior sexual
activities, regardless of whether such activities constitute

uncharged criminal offenses.
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However, such disclosure is not privileged under Kansas law. 88 In
fact, if the defendant makes this disclosure, the Kansas prison
authorities are obliged under the law to call the prosecutor and
inform him/her that the defendant has admitted to some unsolved
crimes. 89 It seems like a classic Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination circumstance, does it not?
However, the Court said this is not a violation of the
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
for a number of reasons. 90 First, what would refusal to participate
do to a defendant? The defendant would only lose visitation rights,
work opportunities, ability to send money to his family, access to
personal television, and other privileges. 91 The prisoner would go
from lesser security to maximum security, and from a two-person
cell to a four-person cell if he did not submit to the program.V2 But
the Supreme Court, in its wisdom, responded with regard to the
self-incrimination issue that the prisoner is not being compelled to
participate in the sex offender program because what he has to give
up if he does not participate and comply with its requirements is
really not very much. 93 In other words, the punishment for not
complying is not "atypical"; they are the usual things that happen
to prisoners in prison. What the plurality then did was transfer a
concept from Sandin v. Connor,95 a due process case, which held
that, "challenged prison conditions cannot give rise to a due
process violation, unless those conditions constitute atypical and
significant hardships on [inmates] in relation to the ordinary
incidents of inmate life," into the self-incrimination context in
order to conclude that a prisoner is not being deprived of his
privilege against self-incrimination because not being subjected
to
96
compelled.
being
truly
not
is
prisoner
the
treatment,
"atypical"

88 Id.
89 id.

90 McKune, 536 U.S. at 32-37.
91 Id.
92
93 Id.

at 3l.
Id. at 36.

94 id.

515 U.S. 472 (1995).
96d. at 484.
95
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Justice O'Connor did not accept the plurality's Sandin
analysis. 97 However, even though she concluded that the Fifth
Amendment's compulsion standard is broader than the "atypical
and significant hardship" standard for evaluating due process
claims, she too concluded that alterations in the defendant's prison
conditions did not amount to compulsion.98 I find it amazing when
judges who have never been inside a correctional facility state that
the aforementioned privileges that an uncooperative prisoner
would have to relinquish are unimportant.
When looking at prior Fifth Amendment cases, it would be
difficult to find a case that in any way suggests that the decision in
McKune is a proper ruling. Prior decisions uphold the privilege
even if a person faces loss of the ability to engage in a public
contract or to work at a public employment job. 99 Many cases hold
that a person cannot be required to give up his Fifth Amendment
privilege because of a threat. However, here the Court says,
because Lile is a prisoner, it was constitutional. 00 I find it a very
troubling decision. Of course, I agree with the other side. Justice
O'Connor's rejection of the plurality's self-incrimination analysis
allows one to hope that the damage caused to the privilege against
self-incrimination can be contained.
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
In Alabama v. Shelton, 101 another five to four decision, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases applies even to cases in which the defendant is
given a suspended sentence.' 0 2 There was a gap between two cases

McKune, 536 U.S. at 48 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9' id. at 48-49.
99 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973) (holding that the
state could not compel testimony from public contractors by threatening to
cancel their contract if they did not comply); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493, 497-98 (1967) (holding that police officers could not be coerced into
incriminating themselves under the threat of job loss).
1oo McKune, 536 U.S. at 49.
'01 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
02 Id. at 674 (holding "[a] defendant who receives a suspended or probated
97

sentence to imprisonment has a constitutional right to counsel.").
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10 3
decided in the 1970s. The first was Argersinger v. Hamlin,
decided in 1972, which held that a defendant has a right to counsel
in a misdemeanor case if it may result in even the briefest
imprisonment.10 4 The second case was Scott v. Illinois,105 decided
in 1979, where the Court held that an indigent defendant who is
not sentenced to imprisonment does not have a right to assigned
counsel. 10 6
However, what had not been decided was a
defendant's right to counsel who had received a suspended
sentence that could be revoked if he violated the terms of
probation.
In Shelton, the Court said that is different from Scott; it
falls on the defendant's side because at a probation revocation
hearing the defendant is precluded from testing the merits of his
underlying conviction.10 7 The only issue at a probation revocation
hearing is whether the defendant violated the terms or conditions
of probation.' 0 8 Therefore, said the Court, "the defendant would
be deprived of that 'crucible of meaningful adversarial testing' ,109
of his case, and the reliability of the defendant's conviction is "the
key Sixth Amendment inquiry" that entitles a defendant to
counsel.110
In dissent, Justice Scalia said essentially that this is a
federalism issue."1 ' He argued that the Court is imposing on the
states' resources, since they will now have to provide counsel in all
such cases.' 12 Justice Scalia believed that only twenty-four states

103 407
104

U.S. 25 (1972).
Id. at 37 (stating that "'the prospect of imprisonment for however short a

time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may
well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his
reputation."') (internal citations omitted).
05 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
106 Id. at 373 (agreeing with Argersinger's holding "that actual imprisonment
is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of
imprisonment ... [and warrants adopting] actual imprisonment as the line
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel").
107 Shelton, 535 U.S. at 666.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 667 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
110 Id.
.".
Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112 Shelton, 535 U.S. at 679.
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3
already do this, so twenty-six would be affected by this decision."1
The majority believed only sixteen states are affected.1 4 The case
does not have an impact in New York, because there is no problem
with the right to counsel in similar circumstances. New York has
always been a leader in affording indigents the right to counsel,
except, of course, with regard to the fees paid to assigned counsel.
The two remaining Sixth Amendment cases involved
ineffective assistance of counsel. The first case is Mickens v.
Taylor. "5 Suppose an attorney is on her cell phone and says "Hi,
Mom, remember the kid I told you about, who the judge assigned
me to represent? He was killed. But not to worry; the judge just
assigned me to represent the person who they say killed him. In
addition, the prosecution is seeking the death penalty. I am going
to take the case, but I don't think I should tell my client that I
represented the guy who he is charged with killing." Does
anybody not have a problem with this? The Supreme Court, with
Justice Scalia writing for the majority, had no problem with this.
Why? Because there was no proof that this conflict in any
way
6
affected the defendant's representation in this capital case."
In Mickens, the deceased had been brought into juvenile
court based on his mother's complaint. 117 In addition, the
18
defendant and the deceased were in a homosexual relationship.
The majority stated that it was not interested in these facts because
there was no showing that the trial attorney in any way limited his
cross-examination or that this conflict affected his representation' 19
and the defense attorney did not learn anything confidential from
the deceased that was relevant to the defense at trial or
sentencing. 120 Thus, the majority held that there must be a
reasonable probability that the conflict in question led to
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth
22
Amendment.' 2' And the Court found no such probability.1
113 Id.

114

Id. at 669.

"' 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
116 Id. at 172-74.
Id. at 183 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"8 Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17
9

Id. at 175.

120 Mickens,
121 Id. at

535 U.S. at 171.
174.
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Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the same judge had
assigned the attorney to both defendants, 123 and that "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.' 24 Justice Souter, in his dissent,
stated that the Court's prior holdings in the Wheat line of cases
requires the judge to inquire into potential conflicts, especially in a
case such as this.' 25 However, the interesting issue in terms of
prejudice at the capital sentencing phase of the case is that the
prosecutor argued that all the deceased's mother did in life was
"live for that boy."' 126 Justice Souter pointed out that the defense
attorney failed to inform the jury that the deceased's mother, who,
in the words of the prosecutor, "lived for that boy," had in fact
filed charges alleging that she was assaulted by her wonderful
child. 27 Further, the jury that imposed the death penalty was not
apprised of this information. 128 In opposition to the majority, the
Breyer/Ginsburg dissent stated that the facts in this case embodied
the type of representation that is egregious on its face, exacerbated
by the fact that this was a capital case. 129 Furthermore, they
emphasized that the Commonwealth itself created the conflict by
allowing the30 same judge to assign the same lawyer to both
defendants.'
In another Sixth Amendment case, Bell v. Cone, 131 the
Court kept the bar very high for defendants who must prove
ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, the trial attorney
remained silent at the capital phase. 132 The case involved the
killing of an elderly couple by the defendant, who was a Vietnam

122

id.

123 Id. at

180 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 189 (internal citations omitted).
125 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 189 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Wheat v. United
124

States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (holding "a judge who knows or should know that
counsel for a criminal defendant facing, or engaged in, trial has a potential
conflict of interests is obliged to enquire into the potential conflict and assess its
threat
to the fairness of the proceeding.")).
26

Id. at 185.
at 208 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
12ld. at 165.
1

127Id.
129

130
'3'

Id. at 210 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Mickens, 535 U.S. at 210.
535 U.S. 685 (2002).

...
Id. at 701.
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veteran. 133 The defendant had gone to college; however, after his
Vietnam experience, he was never the same. 134 At trial, the
defendant raised the defense of insanity. 35 However, the defense
attorney at the sentencing phase did nothing to establish
mitigation.' 36 To paraphrase him, he said, "I did nothing because I
don't get to speak last and the assistant prosecutor who spoke
before me was not really saying very much."' 3 7 He continued, "If I
got up to say anything, the primary prosecutor, the really heavy138
hitter, would get up and really be able to lay into me."'
Consequently, the jury never learned that the defendant was
awarded the Bronze Star for his courage in Vietnam.' 39 The Court
determined that this was not a structural defect in the
proceeding. 140 Accordingly, the Court held that application of the
Strickland standard of reasonable competence
to this case did not
41
counsel.'
of
assistance
establish ineffective
There are many other cases that raise concern that the Court
is too lenient as to the standard of competence to which defense
attorneys are held. I think that most courts are not very
113
134
35

Id. at 689.
Id. at 701-02.
i at 702.
ld.

Bell, 535 U.S. at 702.
Id. at 721 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 713-14.
136

137
38

39

Id. at 713.

140

Id. at 702.

4 Bell, 535 U.S. at 702. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690

(1984) indicating:
[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge
the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the
facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's
conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective
assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that
are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The court must then determine
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance. In making that determination, the court
should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in
prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial
testing process work in the particular case.
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demanding. I have been running an innocence project at Brooklyn
Law School for over a year now. A fact of life is that a
predominant number of actual innocence cases are accompanied by
ineffective assistance of counsel. A more demanding performance
standard as a matter of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence from the
Supreme Court could reduce the number of erroneous convictions.
Capital Cases
That takes me to what I believe is the most important work
of the term: the capital cases. I think it has been a rather
remarkable term in a number of ways, as the Court overruled two
of its own recent decisions. There is no question in my mind that
the Court, including Justice O'Connor, is beginning to realize that
there is a serious problem in the country regarding wrongful
conviction; it is a reality that is beginning to prey on more than one
of the Justices' minds.
142
The Court decided three capital cases: Ring v. Arizona, ,
which applied the Apprendi v. New Jersey rule to a capital case at
the sentencing phase,1 3 Atkins v. Virginia,'" which concerned
capital punishment of the mentally retarded, 145 and Kelly v. South
Carolina,146 which expanded the universe in which defendants are
entitled 4 to
have the jury informed that they are not eligible for
7
parole. 1
I think by far the most important case is Ring v. Arizona.
As background to this case, recall that in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
the Court held that any fact, except a prior conviction, that
increases punishment beyond the maximum prescribed by the
statute for the offense, must be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 48 The Apprendi Court stated, however, that
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
608. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding
"other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
14'

143 Id. at

and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
'44536

U.S. 304 (2002).

14 Id. at 306.
'46534 U.S. 246 (2002).
147 Id. at 257.
48

1

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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there was no conflict between its ruling and decisions such as
Walton v. Arizona, 149 which allowed judges to find aggravating
circumstances in capital cases.' 50
To paraphrase Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi: "you guys have it all wrong; there
is a conflict between what we are doing today and our decision in
Walton."'151 She believed that the majority misread Arizona law
1 52
and that the two decisions were inconsistent.
In Ring, the Court found that Justice O'Connor had been
correct and the Court now concluded that aggravating
circumstances must be tried to the jury, and not to a judge, because
aggravating circumstances are essentially elements of the capital
crime. 153 In Ring, a jury convicted the defendant. 154 The case
involved an armored car robbery, which is a first-degree felony
murder, but the jury did not find Ring guilty of premeditated
murder. 155 However, at the sentencing phase, an accomplice
testified in front of the judge that the defendant was the ringleader
and that the crime was Ring's idea from the beginning.156 The
judge, basing his decision on the testimony of Ring's accomplice,
imposed the death penalty.' 57 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, relied on Justice O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi and
held that Walton v. Arizona is overruled insofar as it allowed a
judge sitting without a jury to find an aggravating circumstance
necessary for imposition of the death penalty. 158 The implications
of this decision have not yet fully been felt. At present, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana and Nebraska all have statutes similar to
Arizona's. 159 Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana have a
different system where the jury makes a recommendation, but the
judge imposes the sentence. 160 It is estimated that about 800 death
149
50
51
152

497 U.S. 639 (1990).
,pprendi, 530 U.S. at 522 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)).

Id. at 536 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Id. at 537-38.

" Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.

:

54 id.
155
Id.
56

1

Id. at 593.

157'id.

58Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
'9 Id.
160 id.

at 608 n.6.
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row inmates could be affected by the Ring decision.161 There are
also unresolved questions about cases in the appellate and postconviction pipelines, in terms of what will be the retroactive effect
of this decision.
The second capital case, Atkins v. Virginia, again raised the
162
issue whether a mentally retarded defendant can be executed.
Thirteen years ago the Court held in Penry v. Lynaugh,163 that
capital punishment could not be prohibited under the Eighth
Amendment solely because the defendant was mentally retarded.' 64
In Atkins, the Court changed its view and in an opinion written by
Justice Stevens overruled Penry. The Court used the following
factors to support its reasoning:
First, the Court said that when Penry was decided in 1989,
the consensus with respect to execution of the mentally retarded
was just emerging. 165 Until 1989, only the federal government and
the State of Maryland had statutes prohibiting the execution of the
mentally retarded. 66 However, since 1989, sixteen more states
have adopted similar statutes.' 67 Thus, the consistent direction of
this change constituted a national consensus. This was significant
because usually "anti-crime legislation is far more popular" than
legislation favoring defendants, 68 the votes in the abolishing states
have been one-sided in favor of eliminating the death penalty for
the mentally retarded, and for thirteen years, no state has enacted
or reinstated the death penalty for the mentally retarded.
Justice Stevens also pointed out that societal consensus is
not the only factor. 169 Cases such as Coker v. Georgia,170 where the
Court held that execution for rape constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, meant that the Court had the right to make its own

16t Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Ruling Roils Death Penalty Cases, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A14, col. 5.
162 536 U.S. at 307.
163

492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruledby Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

'64 Id. at 340.
16'

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314.

166id..
167

Id. at 314-15.

168 Id. at
69

1

315.

Id. at 318.

170 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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judgment. 17 1 The third factor that the Court utilized was the value
of the retribution and deterrence aspects of the death penalty,
which Justice Stevens said speaks less forcibly to the mentally
retarded because they cannot appreciate things in the same manner
72
as those who are not mentally retarded.1
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas
had much to say in dissent. Scalia had one of his truly livid
moments as he derisively labeled the majority opinion "the
pinnacle
of our Eighth Amendment
death-is-different
jurisprudence."' 173 He attacked the majority's definition of a
consensus. With respect to the assertion by Justice Stevens that the
Court can bring its own judgment to the issue, Scalia said, "[tlhe
arrogance of this presumption of power takes one's breath
away.' ' 174

"Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so

175
obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members."'
76
The last of the capital cases is Kelly v. South Carolina.
For the third year in a row, the Court was faced with an issue
177
stemming from its 1994 decision in Simmons v. South Carolina,
concerning a capital defendant's right to a jury instruction on his
ineligibility for parole. 7 1 In this case, during the penalty phase, the
district attorney talked about defendant's dangerousness and called
him a "butcher.', 179 He also stated, "murderers will be murderers";
"you would not want to be 30 feet away from this guy"; and "while
he was inprison he made a weapon and engaged in an attempt to
escape."' 8, In response, the defense attorney sought a Simmons
instruction.' 8 1 A Simmons instruction is an instruction that informs
a jury that if the defendant receives a life sentence, he would be

171 id.at 592.
172 Atkins,

536 U.S. at 319-20.
J., dissenting).

173Id. at 352 (Scalia,
174 Id. at 348.
75

' Id. at 338.

534 U.S. 246 (2002).
'77 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
178 See, e.g., Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001); Ramdass v.
Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000).
534 U.S. at 249.
0 Kelly,
Id.at 248-50.
176

181See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 154.
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ineligible for parole.1 82 The Simmons line of cases holds that a
defendant is entitled to this instruction if the prosecutor presents
evidence of a defendant's future dangerousness."' The state
appellate court in this case believed that this is not what the
prosecution did because the prosecutor was just talking about how
mean the defendant was.184 Regarding the defendant's future
dangerousness, nothing was said or presumed.185 Disagreeing, the
Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor's statements were
not so narrow as to prevent the jury from drawing inferences of
future dangerousness, even though the prosecution did not directly
state that the inference was that the defendant would always be in
trouble.' 86 The Court made the point that "evidence of future
dangerousness under Simmons is evidence with a tendency to
prove dangerousness in the future; its relevance to that point does
not disappear merely because
it might support other inferences or
' 87
terms."'
other
in
be described
Post-Apprendi Cases
Finally, I wish to address the effects of the Apprendi
decision further. When I talked about Apprendi when it was first
decided, I said it was the "sleeper" case of the year. That was an
understatement. But in the noncapital cases decided this term, the
Court has somewhat calmed the concerns of those, like Justice
O'Connor, who believed like "chicken little," that as a result of
Apprendi, the sky was falling.
In Harrisv. United States, 18 8 the Court decided the issue of
whether imposition of mandatory minimum sentences could be
made by a judge based on facts that were not presented to a jury.189
The plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, distinguished
between the Constitution's requirement for facts that increase a
182

Kelly, 534 U.S. at 248.

83

1 Id.
184 Id.at

251.

185Id.

186 Id. at 253-54.
's

Kelly, 534 U.S. at 254.
U.S. 545.

189

Id. at 549-50.

188 536
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minimum sentence and that for the determination of facts that
increase the maximum sentence. 19° The plurality said that
Apprendi was based on the historical practice of treating facts that
91
increase the maximum punishment as offense elements.'
However, it concluded that there is not a clear record of
how
192
punishment.
maximum
the
increase
history treated facts that
Justice Breyer concurred, but he did not agree with the
analysis of the plurality.' 93 He did not think that the plurality had
successfully distinguished facts that establish the top end of a
statutory range from facts that establish the bottom end. He
concurred in the judgment because of his belief that Apprendi was
wrongfully decided. 194
Justice Breyer served on the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and he had much to do with the drafting
of the sentencing guidelines, which are imperiled because of
Apprendi. His concurrence evinces his refusal to see his
contribution to the guidelines diminished.' 95
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that "looking to the
principles that animated the decision in Apprendi, and the basis for
the historical practice upon which Apprendi rested, there are no
logical grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory minimums
any differently than facts that increase the statutory maximums,
whether one raises the floor or raises the ceiling, it is impossible to
dispute that the defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is
otherwise prescribed."' 96
In United States v. Cotton, 9 7 the Court upheld convictions
that predated Apprendi. The Court held essentially that if trial
counsel did not have the clairvoyance to know that the Court
would decide Apprendi and thus to preserve the Apprendi issue for
appellate review, then the plain error rule controls.' 98 The Court
then held there was no plain error in this instance "because even
190 Id.

at 557-59.

9'Id. at 563.
192 id.

193

Harris,536 U.S. at 569-70 (Breyer, J., concurring).
I94d.
at 570.

195 Id.

'96Id. at 579.
'9'535 U.S. 625 (2002).
98

Id. at

631.
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assuming respondents' substantial rights were affected, the error
fairness, integrity, or public reputation
did not seriously affect the
' 99
proceedings."'
ofjudicial
The Court relied on its prior ruling in United States v.
Johnson,20 0 which held that a failure to submit the question of
materiality to the jury is not a structural error and thus is unlike an
erroneous reasonable doubt charge that spoils the entire trial
process. 20 1 Applying Johnson, the Court reasoned that "the same
analysis applies to the omission of the drug quantity from the
indictment. 2 2 After appraising the evidence of cocaine base
seized by the police from Cotton and his co-defendants, the Court
concluded that "surely the grand jury having found that the
that the conspiracy
conspiracy existed, would also have found
20 3
involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base."
There is still much uncharted turf out there in Apprendiland. Lower courts are divided on a host of issues, and current
understandings of New York's persistent felon statute may be
questioned in the light of these decisions. Time does not permit
exploration of them. But make no mistake, they are out there and
lawyers and judges will continue to struggle with a host of knotty
issues, some we may not even have thought of yet.
Notwithstanding decisions such as Harrisand Cotton, which rein
in certain logical thrusts of Apprendi, the ingenuity of creative
defense lawyers and the beauty of the common law system ensure
that much more in this arena is yet to come.

'99 Id. at 632.
200 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
20 Id. at 469.
202 Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633.
203

Id.
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